Deepti George

Several studies have found that the Indian banking sector, while having a large number of players, has monopolistic competition.

Banks not passing on rate cuts points to a lack of intensity in price competition and calls for increasing the number of lenders

These recommendations were submitted to the Independent Expert Group for Strengthening the Multilateral Development Banks, under the G20

The SDG Agenda, the sovereign debt crisis and the climate crisis will need brave leadership from not just individual governments of both the global north and the south, but also groups such as the United Nations, the G20, G7 and others, to closely negotiate tough decisions that can have enough impact on the triple inequality – of wealth, carbon and power.

Tremendous efforts have gone into creating new authoritiessuch as the Central Consumer Protection Authority.

By requiring only limited public reporting on asset quality, banks in India have enjoyed a level of opacity that banks in other jurisdictions do not

An RBI Working Group has suggested that lending service providers be disallowed from providing credit enhancements such as FLDG (first-loss-default-guarantee). However, a risk-proportionate regulation of FLDG could address its risks, while allowing the ecosystem to benefit from innovation.

In our response, we question the assumptions put forth by the discussion paper for the creation of DBs and the concomitant licensing and regulatory regime.

Bad Banks are typically Government sponsored Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs) setup with the primary objective of cleaning up bank balance sheets. Unlike private ARCs, the Bad Banks are setup as a one-time measure with the primary objective of reducing the build-up of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) post a financial or economic crisis.

In this policy brief, we compare the design and historical experience of Bad Banks in other jurisdictions with the newly setup NARCL across dimensions relating to legal character, government control, objectives, funding sources, resolution process and level of haircuts. We perform this analysis for the Resolution Trust Corporation in US, Securum and Retrieva in Sweden, Korea Asset Management Company in South Korea and Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorrro in Mexico. Using the insights from our comparative analysis, we identify certain design flaws in NARCL and propose some policy measures to rectify them.