Complex financial instruments and products can help consumers to meet their precise financial needs even if they are opaque in their design details due to the underlying mathematical principles. Regulators need to understand that restricting complexity in design is not in the best interests of the consumer.
In this post, we Introduce the Dvara-Haqdarshak Study on Exclusion in Government to Person Payments.
Blog post series: This series of posts will attempt to do two things – first, to examine the definitional boundaries of social protection and where they relate to other financial services for low-income households, and second, to use this to arrive at a working definition of social protection for policymakers and research organisations such as Dvara Research. As a first step, we break down a few questions in this first post.
Disruptive innovations (mainly through digitalisation) are resulting in a change in the structure of markets and their functioning, emergence of new business models as well as new products and processes (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017).
Offering affordable derivative products that will help them hedge against price and weather risks is vital
Bad Banks are typically Government sponsored Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs) setup with the primary objective of cleaning up bank balance sheets. Unlike private ARCs, the Bad Banks are setup as a one-time measure with the primary objective of reducing the build-up of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) post a financial or economic crisis.
In this policy brief, we compare the design and historical experience of Bad Banks in other jurisdictions with the newly setup NARCL across dimensions relating to legal character, government control, objectives, funding sources, resolution process and level of haircuts. We perform this analysis for the Resolution Trust Corporation in US, Securum and Retrieva in Sweden, Korea Asset Management Company in South Korea and Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorrro in Mexico. Using the insights from our comparative analysis, we identify certain design flaws in NARCL and propose some policy measures to rectify them.
Providing a human interface at crucial touch points such consent, disclosure, and grievance redressal will allow for trust in fintech to rise, driving financial inclusion
In this piece, we revisit Enthoven’s principles and propose a broader definition of the concept of managed competition in order that it may encompass other countries’ experiences that do not conform to a strict application of Enthoven’s concept.
In all our research efforts, we strive to maintain an independent voice that speaks for the low-income household and household enterprises. Our ability to perform this function is significantly enhanced by our commitment to disseminate as a pure public good, all the intellectual capital that we create.
