Independent Research and Policy Advocacy

New perspectives on farmer distress and farmer suicides

Save Post


By Nachiket Mor

I recently had an opportunity to read an interesting book on farmer suicides in the Yavatmal district of Maharashtra by Secretary Health Meeta Rajiv Lochan1 (meeta29 [at] and Professor Rajiv Lochan2 (mrajivlochan [at] This book was first published in 2006 by the Yashwantrao Chavan Academy of Development Administration at Pune3.

The book was written in the aftermath of the spate of farmer suicides that were widely reported from Yavatmal district of Maharashtra during the five year period from 2000 to 2004. The book cites data from the State Crime Records Bureau of Maharashtra (SCRB) which shows that during this period the annual average for Yavatmal was 773 with between 25 to 30% of them being farmers. The authors point out that even though in terms of SMR (Suicide Mortality Rate = Suicides per 100,000 population) neither the District nor the State standout4, these numbers were considered highly unusual because they were directly comparable to the total for Mumbai (1100) while the population in the entire Yavatmal District at 2.45 million was only about a quarter of Mumbai’s population and because of the sharp rise over the last three decades in both the total number of suicides5 as well as the proportion of farmers (and housewives) impacted6. Since both the authors are very familiar with the manner in which government works, they were able to go the most appropriate sources for the data they needed. The book as a consequence has a good deal of carefully collected background information on whole issue of suicides as well as on Yavatmal which is well worth reading. For the book the authors interviewed the families of all of the farmer suicides that were reported by the local administration during the period January 1, 2001 to December 31st, 2005 – a total of 399 cases.

One of the principal lessons that they draw from their work is that: “It has been presumed until date that rural indebtedness is the root of all trouble. This postulate may not be entirely correct, as we shall see in the discussion that follows. Writing off rural debts is not, we submit the correct strategy to deal with the issue since debt was not the problem in the first instance.” The authors feel that seeing indebtedness as the cause is both convenient and stereotypical (the “rapacious moneylender”) which is why it is often the favoured choice. The authors also feel that the existing studies (they specifically refer to the ones carried out by TISS7and IGIDR8) did not adequately understand and analyse the data and the cases and quickly rushed to pronounce indebtedness caused by poor agricultural performance as the principal cause of distress leading to suicides9. The authors’ own examination of Yavatmal cases suggests to them that “even when debt existed it was factors other than debt, where were important for making the farmer a victim of suicide”.

From a study of the productivity patterns in Yavatmal they find that for cotton and for pulses (the other major cash crop for Yavatmal) the wide variation in annual productivity is not a recent phenomenon but exists right from the 1960s10, leading them to state that: “Might this suggest that production tribulations are part of the agricultural cycle and that change in it would, while affecting the finances of a farmer in the short run, not depress him enough to resort to suicide?”

After reviewing the existing studies they carefully examine each one of the 399 cases. They find that from a statistical point of view that neither caste nor marginal landholdings as a factor stand out thus suggesting to them that the data is not supportive of the popular view that marginalisation was a key factor. In terms of debt they find that about half the farmers had taken loans from informal sources and about three quarters from institutional sources11. They also found that only about a quarter had paid their institutional loans fully, 10% had paid partially, and about 40% had defaulted entirely. Of the 148 suicide cases that comprise the 40% they found that only in two cases that coercive action had been taken by the bank for the recovery of its dues. Others had received demand notices and were amongst the thousands to whom such demand notices were routinely sent12. Based on their analysis the authors state that: “How burdensome these demand notices were felt to be is anybody’s guess just as the issue of the seriousness with which a loan is repaid is an open question.” After examining all the cases for the various factors likely to be causing stress to the individual who committed suicide, the authors conclude that even where families were indebted it is not obvious that the financial stress was the principal trigger13. For example while studying cases of families that has large expenditures on healthcare, the authors conclude that, “In all these cases, families had large outstanding loans to pay out but there was also a large amount of social distress [unrelated to the debt] such that it is difficult to see that loans had much of a role to play in the tragedy that happened.”

Based on the extensive research that they carried out the authors conclude that there are two underlying problems that, in their opinion, seem to underpin all of the cases and appear consistent with the statistical data that they examined:

1. A very average low income of Rs.2500 per acre which was simply not enough to meet the requirements of farmer households. In their view it is the absence of adequate income rather than indebtedness that was at the root of most issues.

In order to address this, the authors favour direct cash transfers over other indirect subsidy mechanisms which have a serious risk of capture or being misdirected.

2. An extremely high level of isolation both from his / her fellow villagers as well as with the government machinery. Even in a popular movement like the SHG (self-help group) movement, while a few states have somewhat higher rates of participation, in Maharashtra participation in SHGs was as low as 5% at the household level. The authors were surprised to discover how few were the numbers of farmers (only 25%) that had any familiarity with concepts such as MSP (Minimum Support Price), or crop insurance. On this issue the authors conclude as follows: “Most farmers also did not belong to any formal registered body like a registered famers’ society or self-help group. Even fewer take any help or advice from these voluntary associations. Might this suggest the farmer to be a relatively lonely individual struggling against overwhelming odds? Without any help or back up support?”

In order to deal with this the authors strongly recommend that enhancing the frequency of “…physical interaction between government functionaries and village society by insisting on more tours, night halts, and gram sabhas by officers at all levels of the administration.

For those of us that are interested in the development of rural areas and have been particularly troubled by the whole suicide issue this book is a must read. The painstaking efforts by authors both to document each and every interview they have done as well as all of the statistical data they have gathered and presented, make this book also a very good reference book of a great deal of value to every library.

  1. The book was written when she was Director, Maharashtra State Institute of Rural Development.
  2. He is a Professor of Contemporary Indian History at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration at Mussoorie
  3. “Farmer Suicides: Facts and Possible Policy Interventions”. The original book was published in 2006 but I referred to the 2010 Kindle Edition that was available from Amazon.
  4. The authors find that while Maharashtra has an SMR of 14, in Kerala it is 33, and in Japan it is as high as 40.
  5. From a total of 70 in 1975 to 613 in 2005 with SMR rising from 1.55 in 1962 to 9.34 in 2000.
  6. The authors find that the proportion of farmers and agricultural labourers rose steadily from a level of 18.57% in 1975 to 53.83% by 2005.
  7. Ajay Dandekar et al, “Causes of Farmer Suicides in Maharashtra: An Enquiry”, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 2005.
  8. Srijit Mishra, “Suicides of Farmers in Maharashtra”, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, 2005
  9. The authors find for example that in the TISS report a case on a loan of Rs.100,000 has been included in which the default had occurred 17 years prior to the date of the suicide and one on a loan of Rs.13,000 in which the default occurred 13 years ago.
  10. “In 1960-61, the earliest year for which we have data available [on the productivity for cotton], it was 103 kg/ha. Then it slumped to 47 in 1961-62, went up to 97 kg/ha in 1963-64, and went down to 63 kg / ha in 1966-67 and so on.”
  11. An interesting factor that they find is that: “Yavatmal has had a long history of interest rates of 25% [per season] (sawai) which are referred to as far back as the nineteenth century. In our study, we found that rates charged [by informal sources] varied from 3-5% per month to 25% per season (sawai) or 50% per season (dedhi)”. “A hundred years ago the district gazetteer said that the cultivators in Yavatmal district ‘almost always prefer to borrow from a money lender, paying perhaps twelve per cent interest, rather than from Government at six per cent. The chief reason seems to be that there is still great delay in getting money from the Government, or at least so the people think. It is also believed that certain subordinate servants of Government extract irregular fees while inquiries are made…” Is there a certain lesson in this for us even today?”
  12. The cooperative banks between them had send over 73,000 demand notices during the period from June 2004 to June 2005 and there were about 55,000 Revenue Recovery Cases of the District Central Cooperative Bank in the district.
  13. “Essentially what the empirical data shows is that the issue of rural indebtedness is a red herring. There is very little evidence of the pressure of loans being responsible for the suicide.”


Authors :

Tags :

Share via :

15 Responses

  1. Very interesting ! Though this book specifically
    deals with indebtedness as an issue I cannot help but draw a parallel to
    Hernando de Soto’s book (The Other Path) on the informal economy of Peru. He has equally compelling insights to offer on the second point- exclusion from the government
    machinery. He argues that in the absence of facilitative devices (like land
    titles and documents of identity), the poor are unable to leverage resources to
    accumulate capital and manage risk and eventually driven to extreme measures. The
    solution, he says, lies as much in removing unproductive legal restrictions as
    in ‘formalizing’ the informal sector.

  2. Interesting perspective, and definitely I will like to read this book, and meet the authors.

    Though I wonder, what could be causes of high indebtedness, and to me, low income likely stand out first. Second would be lack of knowledge and arising low self esteem/ confidence. And third would be missing access to right & easy financial instruments, including SHG etc.

    However, one thing that can be likely concluded from above article is, if they would have sufficient money, then those suicides would less likely be committed. Now big question is how to bring this change of sustainable earnings at village HHs?

    Two pillars that stand out are Knowledge and Finance, and both needs to be strongly embedded for effective and long term results. Only Micro Finance or only Gyaan has seen its debacle; it soon start giving rise to other imbalance in terms of poor Health, poor water, high consumption of alcohol/tobacco, poor culture and various other ills and shortfalls.

    Institutes like IFMR and their bottom-up practices of Wealth Mgmt. for its customers are highly credible efforts. And at the same time, work of organizations like Art of Living, inspiring awareness and hope is equally important. It will be great to see further evolution and culmination of so called humanity (spirituality) within Financial inclusion initiatives.

  3. This post is very timely. The farmers’ lack of income and the fact that as individuals rather than a larger organized entity (SHGs for instance) they are unable to access means for betterment.

    I had a similar experience in Siricilla (Andhra Pradesh), which has had a large number of suicides portrayed as “farmer” suicides. A large number were weavers working from home with antiquated machines for low value products, and often without work. Substance abuse is rampant. The govt didn’t help by announcing ex-gratia payments for “farmer” suicides – some were pushed into taking the step so that atleast the family obtained some money through the grant. The underlying theme was a lack of income on a sustaining basis.

    While the banks are making efforts to plug financing, it is necessary to promote means for sustainable livelihoods. Moneylenders have been (notwithstanding their “Kanhaiya Lal character status from movies!) providing livelihood related and social related finance – but prices and incomes have been depressed for many. An alignment of banks to create better income opportunities will also be a business development exercise (albeit a longer term one fraught with risks) besides a development one.

  4. Dear Nachiket

    Thanks for this article. It makes me want to read the book.
    Thanks especially for telling me its avaialbe on kindle and therefore
    accessible even in my part of the world (not evident for books with little known

    Of course suicide is a fascinating subject and of course
    your blog may not have covered all angles of the book, but I did like your
    summary as a starting point for discussion as well as future research.

    During our own research on suicides using NCRB data as well
    as data on different UN sites and correlating it with data from microfinance
    from Sa-Dhan as well as MIX, (see Ashta, Khan, & Otto, 2011), we analyzed the
    data in many different ways. Our paper can be downloaded freely from here:

    We found some correlation between microfinance and suicides
    but often this was not significant, at times it was, often the correlation was
    low, at times it was high (and higher for banks than for MFIs), and causation
    and dependency were not clear. The exact findings are available in that paper.

    The paper also brainstorms many possible causes, just as the
    book seems to do. Since I presume the interested reader will read our paper, I
    will skip our own discussion and recommendations and focus solely on those related
    to the authors of the book being discussed.

    The first suggested cause is low income. But farmers have
    had low income for centuries. So low income is not a cause of suicide. Indeed,
    suicide is higher in rich countries than in poor ones. However, when income is
    low, and one is fragile, the lack of debt repayment capacity may trigger off
    pressures which would normally not be the case if one was not over-indebted. So
    debt may not be the primary cause of suicides, but may well be part of the “change”
    which may have occurred.

    I do admit that in a forthcoming paper in the IIMB
    Management Review (Ashta, 2013),
    I myself recommend raising minimum wages in very poor countries to reduce
    poverty, but not because of preventing suicides; rather, just to give them a
    better life in this incarnation.

    The second suggested cause is isolation. Here I think the
    authors have hit the mark. Yes, with urbanization, farmers may be more lonely.
    This fits into our data (the same Ashta, Khan and Otto, 2011 paper) which shows
    that the problem is not female suicides, but male suicides which go up with development
    (and microfinance). We recommend support groups for males. SHGs have done a lot
    of good work, but may be very female oriented. Female suicides are not going
    up. However, very little work is being done for preventing male suicides from
    going the Western way.

    Arvind Ashta
    Burgundy School of Business, Dijon, France

  5. Thank you all for some very insightful comments. While I am no expert on the issue, it seems very clear even to me that something is happening at a societal level that is resulting in the steep and systematic rise in the number of suicides. As the authors point out and as Thomas in his blog post from Kerala also suggests, economic distress, poverty, and indebtedness are not new phenomena. And, if anything, the steady increase in life-expectancy-at-birth indicates that there is definite nationwide improvement in the health and wellbeing at the population level. All of this lends credence to the conclusion that the authors and two of the posts (by Arvind and Thomas) reach, that it is perhaps increased individual isolation that is the big societal level change which could be the key causal factor. However, if indeed this is the case, it implies that these trends are only likely to accelerate and that the future is likely to be much worse. Because, while “bringing people back together” is a very desirable goal, it is not at all clear to me that is an achievable one even within small communities leave alone at the national level.

    I feel instead that we may need to approach the problem from a different perspective and instead of accepting them as givens, find ways to “make the older problems go away” so that people have increased resilience to address the newer challenges posed to them by deeper societal changes. The work of IFMR Trust ( for example suggests that it is indeed possible to take to scale a design for the delivery of highly customized and comprehensive financial services that have the power to actually “cancel out” the challenges of high levels of volatility in agricultural productivity, rainfall uncertainties, and changes in prices of the harvested crop, household by household. The work of ICTPH (, while not scaled yet, suggests that it is indeed possible to develop a national approach that brings very good healthcare (including mental health), very close to the homes of rural communities, at a highly affordable cost combined with good financial protection measures. It is my belief that approaches such as these are nationally scalable and have the potential to ameliorate a great deal of distress at the household level.

    1. Dear Nachiket,

      I reead the blog with interest. I think the authors have a particular perspective. Having been on the ground for the last 5 years and forming about 200 SHG’s with the widows of Vidarbha in Yavatmal, I agree on one area that cash transfers would be more beneficial. Maybe agencies have to work on SHG’s for next 5 years to improve financial inclusion.

      Suicides have taken place in tribal families turning farmers in the last 60 years or so. The PM’s package has only helped the better off farmers and the cooperative banks improve their NPA’s.

      Cotton crop , I agree , is not the best area. Traditiional jowar may have helped but agencies of Agriculture department are not keen. Cotton seeds and MAHYCO are not the greatest or agencies very interested, good bureacrats or managers have been transferred with impunity.

      Vidarbha is a complex area. We work in a small area in Yavatmal but succesfully.

      Thanks for directing me to this blog. Mathew

  6. Interesting discussion. Thank you all. If a further point may be added:

    The point about social isolation is important both in the context
    of the govt machinery and also in the context of cooperative action at village
    level. If only the primary agricultural credit societies could be involved in
    the task of knowledge management and improving income, it would make a
    tremendous difference. The flower market at Aalsmeer in Holland which generates
    several million euros worth of annual income, is a cooperative enterprise. If
    only we could have such groups, perhaps more of the value chain would remain
    with producer groups and help improve income

    1. This is a very good point you make ma’m. The trouble is that barring a few exceptions the cooperative movement across sectors (not just financial services) has been largely bankrupted or subverted. The principal of one-man-one-vote instead of distributing power has allowed power to concentrate in a few hands who have not always had the preservation of the institution itself as their primary goal. More generally creating locally owned / managed / governed people’s institutions has proved to be a very difficult task. However, as you point out, and as our own work on the ground in the area of financial services shows, it is imperative that we create such institutions. I wonder if you have any ideas on how we might overcome the problems of local mis-appropriation and mis-management in a systematic manner.

  7. Dear Nachiket

    Thanks for your link on linkedin that caught my attention. I will surely make it a point to look up the book and read through. But would like to make some initial
    observations/comments based on our work in low income states. As part of our work
    over the last eight years across different low income states in India, we have
    observed the following:

    1. Information on rights and entitlements is sorely lacking at the beneficiary level. These leads to lack of demand from the beneficiaries.

    2. Each administrative block, and the line functionaries, grapple with different
    guidelines, reporting formats etc etc. Our view is that there needs to be a
    proper analysis of the needs/gaps at micro level based on which program could
    be targeted. Of course all development sector actors do know about microplans
    at village/hamlet level. But, these do remain at the micro level and do not get
    collated for development administrators to better target the schemes. There are
    few initiatives that our partners/projects have piloted in this regard and
    there are some encouraging results.

    2. Plethora of schemes targeting the rural population are administered poorly not because of any programmatic flaw but lack of capacities at the service delivery level. The
    line department functionaries are snowed under these numerous schemes and are
    unable to do justice to even one of them. One new mega scheme overshadows the
    other smaller (in financial terms) ongoing schemes.

    3. Most social security/poverty alleviation programs/sectoral programs do envisage a role for civil society organisation on community mobilisation. IEC, etc. However, it is
    observed that cso’s are constrained by their own capacity to work at scale. I
    am sure there are numerous agencies if given a chance would be able to work at
    incremental scales but the procurement and contractual limitations (payments
    primarily) are a big deterrent.

    While we do agree with Meeta and Rajiv Lochan that indebtedness is not the sole reason for suicides, but surely better program/schemes delivery mechanisms would aid a
    great deal in providing livelihood security for the rural poor. We do believe
    that household level livelihood security would prompt them to engage with the
    markets and various financial/insurance products.

    Thanks again for drawing me to this blog.


  8. The topic is interesting and
    topical too. Thanks to IFMR study.I would like to share my views in this regard

    Under the discussion topic two quotes merit attention

    “Indian farmer is born in debt, lives in debt,
    dies in debt and bequeaths debt” Now commit suicide in debt. The cycle
    continues with poverty and inequality in rural area. Another French proverb
    “Credit supports the farmer as the hangman’s rope support the hanged” The
    insights on the dynamics of credit (debt) functioning reveal that ‘sequestered’
    credit, without any supporting factors for causing the desired outcome in be it
    farm or non farm sector, is harmful. Credit ‘per se’ is not a direct input
    until it is transformed into direct input like seed, fertilizer, pesticide,
    water, power livestock, and other linkage services (forward & backward ) in
    the production process of the IG activity, financed.. Micro credit is necessary
    but not sufficient for the intended consequences. It is therefore asserted that
    theoretically credit could not become a direct causative factor for suicides
    and causes may be attributed to non availability of non credit inputs or
    inaccessibility to such inputs timely , adequately ,affordably and
    qualitatively for the respective activity undertaken from poor borrowers
    perspectives,. However there are two kinds of happenings in rural financial
    landscape with one proving the above theory mostly in demand side and another
    disproving it by and large in supply front.

    In the case of first argument it is a fact that causative factor for suicides among others, by and large such as a) high soaring input prices particularly for commercial crops and livestock ( while shifting from food crop to cash crops-Maharashtra &Karnataka), Failed bore well wells (AP) , unfavorable Price level of cotton (Maharashtra) b) lack of
    water for farm irrigation due covariant risk ( monsoon failure) and interstate
    water dispute for sharing ) Tamilnadu have contributed farm crisis with an
    outcome of over indebtedness, debt stress, social ignominy and ultimately
    suicide . Here it may be noted that the latter sordid events in the outcome
    mapping is consequences of the former ones.

    In the second one which disproves the above theoretical
    interpretation for the suicide ( debt alone responsible for suicide) raises a

    Knowing fully well on the fact the inadequacy or
    limitation of mere micro credit input without adequate support services and
    inflationary economic situation affecting input prices and covariant risk
    impact for the said activity leading unintended outcome , why micro credit has
    been indiscriminately pumped without any credit discipline in to rural
    households leading to multiple finance and multiple borrowing, overheating the
    house hold economy , (Thanks to SHG-Bank linkage program ) ? It is irony to
    note that when MFI grows, money lenders also have grown simultaneously as
    reported. Calling themselves as MFI , why do they (most of them) confine to
    money lending only with high inetrest rate to increase the indebtedness of farmer without going for other pro poor MF services like micro insurance? Eventually, the supply side factors such as Unethical competition , overdose of loans to same cohort clients by more than one lender (apart from money lender) inappropriate MF products (one size fits
    for all) without considering capability differentials among the poor, prudential
    micro credit planning, ignorance of credit absorptive capacity in a given
    service area , predatory lending, group pressure , coercive recovery practices,
    have also contributed suicides among others as witnessed in AP .

    There are multiple contributory factors for debt related suicides but vary contextually. It is high time to seriously do micro level integrated credit planning with non credit inputs and have in built result based M&E system in the process of MF intervention in poverty sector. In this context integrated MF product such credit linked insurance (health, crop,
    livestock , and IG activity) , active participation in local group system and
    coordination among the other development partners in the given area assume
    greater role in challenging the indebtedness-suicide syndrome.

    The focused point here is need to ensure all the pro poor inputs which are available some time even in the form of free public good, outreach the same cohort collectively without
    sequestration. In India , Lead Bank scheme of RBI/NABARD with its innovative ideology
    and micro level planning exercise like DCP/AAP/PLCP, have immense
    potential for effecting such a coordination among the actors for arranging the
    needed inputs and timely monitoring the same but ironically there is much grass
    to water despite its existence for three decades. From the above perspectives,
    I feel , a well coordinated branch banking is more meaningful than technology
    based branchless banking approach at the cost of personal relationship and
    client protection care between the poor clients and the banker. The lesson from suicide syndrome is also a pointer for careful financial inclusion through mobile magic.

    Thank you for sharing my views
    Dr Rengarajan

    Dr Rengarajan

    1. Dear Dr. Rengarajan,

      The research that the two authors carrry out in Yavatmal District does not support either of your conclusions. After a careful analysis of the 399 cases and the district they find that indebtedness was not the causal factor in any of the households and that farm income volatility has always been high in that area and unrelated to increase in suicides over the last several decades. I have covered both these points in my review of their book. I would be grateful if you could share with us the names of the specific studies that you have in mind when you reach your conclusions.
      Nachiket Mor

  9. Dear Nachiket

    Thank you for your response to my comment

    1. I am not differing from the study conclusion .In fact I have argued that monetary factor be its term credit or debt or loan or over indebtedness cannot be the direct
    causative factor for suicide phenomenon contextually in the study area. The
    rationale for this argument has also been explained in my post in detail for the benefit of readers and researchers in rural/ micro financial management.
    2. Regarding concluding points of the authors of the study on (1)cash
    transfer and (2)for avoiding isolation a close interaction with government
    agencies I wish to share the following .
    The concluding points need to emerge from the etymology of the basic issue
    and address the rudimentary causes for said issue.. That is what are the
    rudimentary problems or what are causative factors which have resulted low income as output leading indebtedness ultimately with an outcome like financial stress & suicides
    ? In this case, Income generation is low due to production tribulation (as reported)
    but even it is a cyclical one as stated, why and what went wrong in input administration particularly after shifting from food crop to cash crop in the study area ? Identification
    of such causative factors in prep production stage and post production stage in production chain would facilitate for easy location and taking suitable corrective measures in the causal process itself.

    In this above frame work, authors’ point on direct cash transfer substituting other indirect subsidy mechanism is only justified for output with “low income or absence of adequate
    income but not necessarily concerned with for reinforcing the input values in
    the result chain during the pre and production stage for reducing stated production tribulations. However it may help in post production stage for compensating the loss
    of farm income and meeting the requirements of farmhouse hold. But here again the adequacy of income to the requirements depends of size of family and degree of deprivation and health vulnerability in their respective households. Still there is risk of capture or misdirection as you reported agreeably.In this regard a pilot scheme of cash
    transfer (as reported in The Hindu 4th Jan 2013) is being implemented by SEWA and UNICEF in which the cash provided has been a small top up to existing subsidies. “As a result , nobody in the village is worse off than before.” But the long term benefit of cash transfer suggestion in the post production stage remains to be seen

    Second one, again not necessarily related to effective management of input factor for claiming adequate income from farming, may certainly facilitate avoiding isolation psychologically particularly during financial stress while participating in Farmers’ club/ SHG/JLG. Here it is agreed with authors’ concern over low percentage of participation with 5 % at household level in Maharashtra state while SHG movement is claimed to be a popular mode of empowerment and micro financing at national level patronized
    by government. Here my hypothetical concern is that whether eligibility criteria (poverty status/land holding size?) to become member in SHG, is posing some hurdles in this regards there by causing low level participation? Further group/peer pressure for repayment of loan may also sometime aggravate financial stress to the members causing social ignominy leading to sordid end.
    This apart, I feel that suggestion for strengthening the input side in the result chain , reinforced by forward and backward linkages would help more for reducing the cyclical tribulations in production process and sustaining
    adequate income more particularly for commercial crop cultivation practices in
    the study area. In this regard the potential of existing resources at district
    level like micro level credit planning exercises by the respective lead bank, Potential linked credit plan of NABARD , coordination forums for the bankers , insurance companies, and government development officials , SHG federations need to be harnessed in a manner for addressing the above issue and arrangement of integrated inputs collectively by the actors with accountability.
    Thank you for sharing my views
    Dr Rengarajan

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Related Posts :